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Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion
of First Amendment Freedoms
Despite the fact that no important case involving First Amend-
ment freedoms was decided by the Supreme Court prior to 1919,
judicial protection of constitutional rights of privacy has involved
ever increasing litigation and what appears to be ever increasing con-
fusion in the cases. Behind the great mass of litigation in this field and
the at least surface confusion of the cases lie two great dilemmas. The
first is that posed so well by Abraham Lincoln, "Must a government of
necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to
maintain its own existence?" The second is that dilemma so peculiar
to every field of the law; the desire for certainty in legal principles on
the one hand, and the desire for justice in the individual case on
the other.
With these conflicts as a background, the Supreme Court has
arrived at a solution of First Amendment cases which can be described
as a process rather than a set of "inexorible" rules. The Court has
recognized that, in essence, the problem is one of weighing the
interests of the individual in maintaining his liberties as against the
interests of the State in protecting the community. "A survey of the
relevant decisions indicates that the results which we have reached
are on the whole those that would ensue from careful weighing of
conflicting interests."1
The Court in each case, then, must decide whether the rights of the
individual should be protected or whether there is a public interest
justifying or overriding the accompanying invasion of individual
rights. As the Court has stated it:
1 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951). The necessity of a weighing
or balancing process has often been emphasized by the Court. "We are faced in
the instant case with the necessity of weighing the conflicting interests of the ap-
pellant in the dvil rights she claims, . . . against the interest of the community...1
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). "The demands of free speech
in a democratic society as well as the interest in the national security are better
served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the
confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas." Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at
519, 525, 542, 543, and 561 (1951); American Communications Association v. Douds,
339 U.S. 383 at 393 and 400 (1950); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474
(1950); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946).
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.. the problem is the relative necessity of the public interest
as against the private rights. Even assuming private rights
of the timid to be of the fullest weight, the problem remains
whether they outweigh the public necessities in this matter.2
This process of balancing the individual interests as against the
public interest of necessity involves a consideration of many factors.
As the Court itself has said, "The complex issues presented by regula-
tion of speech (and this is true of all First Amendment freedoms) in
public places, by picketing, and by legislation prohibiting advocacy of
crime have been resolved by scrutiny of many factors besides the im-
minence and gravity of the evil threatened." 3
Understanding First Amendment decisions, then, involves two
problems; comprehending the basic balancing process involved, and
recognizing the various factors which the Court uses in that process
as well as their significance. This comment will treat those two
problems in reverse order, with a final section intended to synthesize
the factors and thus present a picture of the complete balancing
process involved.4 While it is true that any discussion of First Amend-
ment decisions completely divorced from questions of policy and of
jurisdiction, both in the power and the ought sense, cannot present the
whole picture, it is hoped that this comment may make some con-
tribution toward an understanding of at least the mechanics of First
Amendment decisions.
INDIVIDUAL INTEREST
Before an individual's personality rights will be constitutionally
protected, there must at least have been a factual invasion of them.
Despite an assertion by the individual that his personality rights have
been invaded, the Court on analysis may decide that there has, in
fact, been no invasion. When they so decide, the Court, of course, need
consider nothing else in so far as the First Amendment is concerned.
Where, however, the Court is convinced that a factual invasion of
personality rights has occurred, they must then weigh the individual
interest in preventing that invasion. The cases indicate that in
weighing the individual interest in a particular case the Court may
consider three factors: the aspect of personality invaded, the magnitude
of the invasion, and the appropriateness of the invasion. These factors
will be considered in detail below.
2 Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1948).
3 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951).
4 The analysis and ideas expressed in this comment are largely based on the
analysis of Professor Frank R. Strong of The Ohio State University as presented in
his book AMEmCAm CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1950).
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The Aspect of Personality Invaded.
This factor includes a recognition that there are various aspects
of personality which receive constitutional protection, and a deter-
mination of the relative importance and corresponding protection of
the particular aspect invaded in each case. There are, of course, many
aspects of personality, and categorizing them depends upon the use to
which the resulting categories will be put. Relevant here, therefore,
are only those facets of personality which the Supreme Court has
accorded constitutional protection. These can be classified into four
basic aspects: (1) bodily integrity or the person,5 (2) spiritual in-
tegrity or the mind, the spirit and the soul,6 (3) physical integrity or
the right of external physical privacy,7 and (4) reputational integrity
or the right of reputational privacy.8 Within each of these four aspects
of personality are many different but related activities; for instance,
religion, itself only a part of spiritual integrity, is expressed through
many different activities. These varying activities are not identically
protected, but receive different degrees of protection according to
judicial conceptions of the social importance of the particular activity.
Each aspect of personality, therefore, may receive a range of con-
stitutional protection determined by the range of social importance of
5 U.S. CONsT. AMEND. XIII, §1; U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, §1. "No State 'shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' says
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. By the term 'life' as here used,
something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its
deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The
provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an
arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of
the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. The depriva-
tion not only of life, but of whatever God has given to every one with life, for its
growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question, if its efficacy be
not frittered away by judicial decison." Field, J., dissenting in Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 142 (1877).
6 "The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of freedom of the human
mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express them." Mr.
Justice Stone dissenting in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604
(1940).
7 "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police.., is
basic to a free society .... The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a
prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the
police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as incon-
sistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic
constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples." Mr. Justice Frankfurter de-
livering the opinion of the Court in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
s "Analyzed, freedom to remain silent is essentially freedom from the embar-
rassment and mental suffex.ng which flows from, enforced disclosure of personal oddity
or social non-conformity; .... " STRONG, CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 773 (1950). See
The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REx. 193 (1890); Pound, Interests of Personality,
28 HARv. L. REv. 445 (1914).
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the activities within the aspect. Since this paper is limited chiefly to a
discussion of First Amendment Rights, only spiritual integrity will be
treated in detail below.
(1) Bodily integrity. Of the four aspects of personality, bodily
integrity was the first to receive constitional protection, and has since
received the highest degree of protection. Illustrating this high degree
of protection is the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment which safe-
guards bodily integrity is the only Amendment operating directly
against invasions by individuals as well as against invasions by
government.
(2) Spiritual integrity. This aspect of personality is second only
to bodily integrity in the quantum of protection accorded by the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has often expressly emphasized the
importance of this aspect.9 Spiritual integrity, of course, covers a very
wide- range of human activities,' 0 and not every activity within its
ambit is as fully protected as every other activity. For freedom of
speech, this concept has been well stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
the recent Dennis case, "Not every type of speech occupies the same
position on the scale of values. There is no substantial public interest
in permitting certain kinds of utterances: 'the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace'."" The even more recent case of Beau-
harnais v. Illinois12 emphasizes this distinction, and adds to the
"lewd and obscene" group libel or race defamation.
Freedom of religion and assembly likewise are composed of various
activities which receive different degrees of protection. As stated by
9 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118 (1943); Cantwell v, Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hague v. C.I.O.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
10 "The press in its historical connotation comprehends every sort of publica-
tion which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 452 (1937); "We have no doubt that motion pictures, like newspapers
and radios, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); As
to movies see also Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 20 L.W. 4329 (1952). "Section 9(h) ...
has the further necessary effect of discouraging the exercise of political rights
protected by the First Amendment." American Communications Association v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950); ". . . Congress has never deemed it wise, if, indeed, it
has considered it constitutional, to interfere with the civil right of using the mail
for lawful purposes." Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Milwaukee Publishing Co.
v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 423 (1921); "There is no doubt that, in connection with
the pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance." West Virginia Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
11341 U.S. 494 at 544 (1951).
12 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952).
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the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, "Thus the Amend-
ment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be."'13
Distinctions among the different activities composing an aspect of
personality seem based on the value to society of the particular activity.
As Professor Chafee has stated it, "The First Amendment protects two
kinds of interest in free speech. There is an individual interest, the
need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them
if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of
action but carry it out in the wisest way."' 4 The Supreme Court has
clearly indicated that the "individual" interest in freedom of speech
is not as highly protected as the "social" interest. In speaking of
profanity, the Court has said, "It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."' 5
Thus the Court does not stop with a bare determination that
spiritual integrity has been invaded, but goes on to determine the
social importance of the particular activity invaded. Only then can
the Court determine the degree of constitutional protection to which
that activity is entitled.
(3) Physical integrity. The cases indicate that this aspect ranks
below spiritual integrity on the scale of protection accorded rights of
personality. 16 The protection which this aspect receives stems from the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but, at present, that protection is
given effect only through the sanction of the federal rule against the
13 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
14 CLU-SE, FrE SpEECH IN THE UNTED STATES 33 (1941).
'5 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). It may be that
cursing receives no constitutional protection whatsoever, for in the Chaplinsky
case the Court quoted with approval from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at
309-310 (1940): "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its
punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument." It
is dear, however, that if such forms of expression receive any constitutional pro-
tection, it is less than that afforded other forms of expression, "A man who is calling
names or using the kind of language which would reasonably stir another to violence
does not have the same claim to protection as one whose speech is an appeal to
reason." Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951).
16 "Speech has therefore a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil
rights. For example, privacy, equally sacred to some, is protected by the Fourth
Amendment only against unreasonable searches and seizures." Mr. Justice Douglas
dissenting in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 S.Ct. 725, 745 (1952).
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admissibility of illegally obtained evidenceY'1 Since this rule is not
mandatory on the states, it is obvious that physical integrity receives
less constitutional protection than either bodily or spiritual integrity.
(4) Reputational integrity. The only effective protection given
this aspect at present lies in the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination,18 which protects individuals only as against criminal
reputation. Currently, however, there is an effort to achieve for this
type of integrity a protection greater than the limited protection now
possible under that privilege. The effort consists of an attempt to link
"the right to remain silent" with freedom of speech, freedom of con-
science, or both. Manifesting this effort is Mr. Justice Murphy's con-
curring opinion in West Virginia State Board v. Barnette, "The
freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution
against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all .... ."19 At present, however, the
cases make it extremely doubtful that any constitutional guaranty of
reputational integrity exists beyond that accorded by the privilege
against self-incrimination. 2 0
The complaint is that when others join and he does not, it
sets him apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating. Even ad-
mitting this to be true, it may be doubted whether the Con-
sitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can
be construed also to protect one from the embarrassment that
always attends noncomformity, whether in religion, politics,
behavior or dress.21
(5) Summary. Four aspects of personality are currently given sub-
stantive constitutional protection. These are bodily, spiritual, physical
and reputational integrity. In First Amendment cases, the Court first
decides whether or not there has been a factual invasion. It then con-
siders the particular activity invaded and accords it a degree of
protection corresponding with its importance to society. If there is to
be a true balancing of the individual interest as against the public
interest, the Court must consider the particular activities invaded,
17 Wolf v. Colorado, 538 U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1930).
18 U.S. CONsr. AMEND. V. Technically the Fifth Amendment is not applicable
to the states. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943). For an attempt to justify a "liberty of silence" on
the basis of the due process clause, see Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional
Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MmiH. L. REv.
181 (1948).
20 Curtis, Wringing the Bill of Rights, 2 Tim PAC. SPEarATOR 361, 368-370
.(1948).
21 Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U.S. 203, 232 (1948).
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since only in that way can the importance of preventing an invasion of
those activities be determined.
Magnitude of the Invasion.
The key to this second factor is the scope or thrust of the invasion.
Although pertinent in determining the constitutionality of invasions
of all four of the aforementioned aspects of personality,22 this factor
will be here treated only as it is applied in First Amendment cases, or
those cases involving spiritual integrity.
Historically the Court resisted a consideration of magnitude.
The decisions merely indicated that there was or was not a factual
invasion of First Amendment freedoms.23 Since the middle 1930's,
however, there has been a definite trend toward a more flexible basis
of determination. After finding a factual invasion, the Court will go
on to determine how great that invasion has been in terms of the
particular activity invaded. Although of relatively recent origin, this
factor has been expressly treated in several Supreme Court decisions
which clearly illustrate its significance.
In Bridges v. California24 the Court, in reversing contempt con-
victions arising out of published comments made regarding pending
litigation, was influenced by its judgment that the magnitude of the
invasion of First Amendment freedoms was great:
We may appropriately begin our discussion of the judgments
below by considering how much, as a practical matter they
would effect liberty of expression. . . Since they punish
utterances made during the pendency of a case, the judg-
ments below therefore produce their restrictive results at the
precise time when public interest in the matters discussed
would naturally be at its height. Moreover, the ban is likely
to fall not only at a crucial time but upon the most important
topics of discussion.2 5 (Emphasis supplied).
22 As to bodily integrity see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). As
to physical integrity see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Oklahoma
Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928). As to reputational integrity see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US. 203, 232 (1948).
23 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919); "Do the people of this land .. .desire to preserve . . . freedom of
speech and of the press ... ? If so, let them withstand all beginnings of encroach-
ment." Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Southerland in Associated Press v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 141 (1937). (Emphasis supplied).
24 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
25 Id. at 268.
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In American Communications Association v. Douds,2 6 the Court
upheld the constitutionality of Section 9 (h) of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1937. Again the magnitude of the invasion of First
Amendment rights was an important factor in the decision, although
this time the Court felt that that magnitude was small:
When the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms is relatively small and the public
interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid
test requiring a showing of imminent danger to the security
of the Nation is an absurdity.2 7 (Emphasis supplied).
In upholding the Hatch Act challenged in United Public Workers
of America (C.LO.) v. Mitchell,2 8 the Court stressed their judgment
that the magnitude of the invasion of personality rights was slight.
"Congress ... leaves untouched full participation by employees in po-
litical decisions at the ballot box and forbids only the partisan activity
of federal personnel deemed offensive to efficiency. With that limita-
tion only, employees may make their contributions to public affairs or
protect their own interests, as before the passage of the Act."2 9 Signifi-
cantly, Mr. Justice Black based his dissent in large part on his judg-
ment that the magnitude of the invasion was extremely great. "Thus
are the families of public employees stripped of their freedom of
political action. The result is that the sum of political privilege left
to government and state employees, and their families, to take part in
political campaigns seems to be this: They may vote in silence; they
may carefully and quietly express a political view at their peril; and
they may become 'spectators' (this is the Commission's word) at
campaign gatherings, though it may be highly dangerous for them to
'second a motion' or let it be known that they agree or disagree with a
speaker."3 0
Significant also in a discussion of the magnitude factor are those
cases in which governmental action invading personality rights has
been held unconstitutional because of its sweeping proscription or
uncertain, all-inclusive standards. 3 ' Although these cases are tradi-
tionally explained by the "void for vagueness," rule or by the argument
that permitted activities as well as evils are prohibited, the language
26 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
27 Id. at 397.
28 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
29 Id. at 99.
30 Id. at 108.
31 Termineniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948); Cafeteria Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia, 283 U.S., 359 (1931).
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of several of these cases has indicated a concern with the concept of
magnitude. In this connection the rationale is that a sweeping proscrip-
tion must necessarily be of the great magnitude due to the wide range
of activities which it prohibits. Illustrative of this approach is the
language of the Court in Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., "The
exercise of the state's power which we are sustaining is the very
antithesis of a ban on all discussion in Chicago of a matter of public
importance. Of course we would not sustain such a ban. The injunction
is confined to conduct near stores dealing in respondent's milk, and it
deals with this narrow area precisely because the coercive conduct
affected it."32 A further example of the relation between indefinite
standards and magnitude is the approach used by the Court in Cant-
well v. Connecticut.33 In that case a Connecticut statute forbidding
solicitation of money or valuables for any alleged religious cause with-
out a certificate first obtained from a designated official was held un-
constitutional. The Court, after approving the power of the states to
"regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally," went on to
indicate that conditioning solicitation in its entirety on first obtaining
a license from an official, who, because of a lack of definite standards,
could exercise discrimination made the magnitude of the particular
invasion of freedoms too great.
Thus, an examination of First Amendment cases since the early
1930's leads to the conclusion that the Court is no longer satisfied with
the bare determination that there has been a factual invasion of First
Amendment freedoms. Today the Court goes on to consider the relative
scope or magnitude of the invasion as well, and the greater that magni-
tude the more likely that the invasion will be unconstitutional. It
therefore becomes important to consider how the magnitude factor is
measured in actual cases. The answer is not simple, for we are dealing
here with intangibles. Basically, however, the problem is one of deter-
mining what part of the entire right has been restricted. This can be
illustrated by the comparison between a statute absolutely prohibiting
religious speeches in parks at any time, and one prohibiting religious
speeches in parks only between 1 and 3 o'clock in the afternoons. The
measurement, in other words, is not absolute like the dollar and
cents measurement of property values, but is a relative measurement
- a consideration of the size of the particular invasion in relation to
the entire rights or freedoms available to the individual. Perhaps a
few illustrations from the cases will clarify the point:
True, exclusion from the area in which one's home is located
is a far greater deprivation than constant confinement to the
32 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941).
33 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.3 4
The injunction is defended, however, on the ground that the
petitioners have been prohibited from passing information to
the public at only some but not all places.35 (Emphasis
supplied).
The range of activities proscribed ... embraces nearly every
practicable, effective means whereby those interested.. . may
enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor
dispute. 36 (Emphasis supplied.).
In the final analysis, then, when governmental action invades
spiritual integrity the magnitude of the invasion is an important factor
in the decision as to constitutionality. To measure magnitude, the
Court uses a relative test; How much of the particular freedom has
been actually and practically proscribed?
Appropriateness of the Invasion.
The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them
into collision with rights asserted by any other individual.
It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention
of the State to determine where the rights of one end, and
those of another begin.37
In a society as complex as ours it is difficult to perform any signi-
ficant act without in some way affecting others. Often when an in-
dividual exercises his freedom of speech, press, religion, or assembly
in a particular manner, the effect is an interference with personality
rights of others. The outstanding example of this is Individual A's use
of a loud speaker in a public park where others are seeking quiet
relaxation. While Individual A is thus exercising his right to speak,
he is also interfering with the rights of others to enjoy peace and quiet
in the public park. In such a situation, unless government intervenes
to curtail the rights of Individual A, Individual A will be invading the
personality rights of other individuals. The degree of probability
that, unless government does step in, Individual A will invade the
rights of others is the fundamental basis of the "appropriateness"
factor. A high degree of probability makes it "appropriate" that
government step in to prevent A's "private" invasion of others.
Probably the outstanding Supreme Court case recognizing the
84 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
85 Mr. Justice Reed dissenting in Carpenters Union v. Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S.
722, 732 (1942).
86 Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
87 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943).
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existence of this factor is Saia v. New York in which Mr. Justice Frank-
furter stated in his dissent:
But modem devices for amplifying the range and volume of
the voice, or its recording, afford easy, too easy, opportunities
for aural agression. If uncontrolled, the result is intrusion
into cherished privacy. The refreshment of mere silence, or
meditation, or quiet conversation, may be disturbed or pre-
cluded by noise beyond one's personal control.
... Surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling
people to listen.... And so I cannot agree that we must deny
the right of a State to control these broadcasting devices so as
to safeguard the rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive
noise but to be free to put their freedom of mind and at-
tention to uses of their own choice.38
While Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion was a dissenting voice in
the Saia case, supra, that case is generally regarded as having been
overruled by Kovacs v. Cooper, in which the Court said, "The pre-
ferred position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty
for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens
to comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in dis-
regard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself."3 9
A negative inference giving further vitality to the appropriate-
ness factor is found in the consistency with which the Court has
alluded to it in striking down legislation invading personality rights
where there existed no indication of injury to others unless govern-
ment interceded.4 0
Although the cases indicate that the "appropriateness" factor has
a significance of its own in First Amendment cases, it may well be
38 334 U.S. 558, 563 (1948). By the express assertion of a majority of the
Justices, the Saia case was overruled by Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
39 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). Other cases in which this criterion has played a
part are: Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 S.Ct. 725, 732-733 (1952); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 279 and cases there cited (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86,
88, 97 (1949) ; Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 558 (1948) ; dissenting opin-
ion in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944); West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 630 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).
40 STRoNG, Amm ucA CoNsMrruroNAL LAW 818-819 (1950). Professor Strong
lists the following cases as supporting this negative inference: West Virginia State
Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-309 (1940); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). Professor Strong also quotes from CHwAm, FR
SPEECH iN THE UNrD STATES 150 (1941): "The only sound explanation of the
punishment of obscenity and profanity is that the words are criminal, not because
of the ideas they communicate, but like acts because of their immediate conse-
quences to the five senses."
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that in reality it is merely another way of considering magnitude
through a net effect approach. The Court, in other words, not only
looks at the magnitude of the government's invasion of Individual A's
rights, but goes beyond to see whether Individual A will invade the
rights of others if he is not stopped. Although this second inquiry is
not stated in terms of magnitude, what the Court apparently wants
to accomplish is a "net" saving of personality rights. By asking
whether the invasion of A's rights can be overbalanced by the saving
of the rights of others, the Court arrives at a net result in terms of
magnitude. The recent case of Beauharnais v. IllinoisA1 seems based
partly at least on this type of reasoning. In that case the Supreme
Court upheld an Illinois group libel statute under which the defen-
dant had been convicted for defaming Negroes as a race. The Court
in the opinion recognized that although the defendant's rights were
being invaded the rights of the entire Negro race were being protected.
The net saving idea is readily apparent.
This indirect consideration of magnitude through the "appro-
priateness" factor is perhaps necessitated by the fact that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot be directly used to prevent "private"
invasions of the rights of others. As a result, the Court is forced to
validate legislation providing protection against individuals or private
invasions of personality rights, or leave private invasions completely
unrestricted.
PUBLIC INTEREST
Since the Court has often stated that First Amendment freedoms
are not absolutes, 42 the problem in each case is one of deciding when
the limits of the protection accorded those freedoms have been
reached. As stated earlier the Court's present answer is a balancing
process in which the individual interest is weighed against the public
interest. Although a particular case may involve a governmental
invasion of First Amendment freedoms which is of great magnitude
and not "appropriate," the Court may still decide that the invasion
is justified by an overriding public interest in achieving the govern-
ment's objective. That public interest must, of course, be one of
genuine importance to all the public. 43 Broken down, this is a re-
41 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952).
42 "Of course, it is accepted constitutional doctrine that these fundamental
human rights are not absolutes." United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947) and cases there cited in note 30.
43 "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest
of all... " (Emphasis supplied). Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); "where
a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
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quirement that there be not only a "factual" public interest, but that
it also be of enough importance to society to overweigh the individual
interest which has been invaded. The method used to weigh the
public interest side of the balancing process is very similar to that
used to weigh the individual interest side - first the Court determines
whether or not there is a factual public interest, and then, if one is
found, they weigh its importance to society through a consideration
of several factors. This side of the balancing process will be consi-
dered in detail below.
A Factual Public Interest.
Obviously governmental action aimed at an unconstitutional
objective can contain no real or factual public interest, and will not
be upheld by the Court. In purely economic affairs the Supreme
Court has indicated by its repudiation of the anti-monopoly bias in
the "due process" clause that apparently government is completely
free in its choice of policy. Where civil liberties are involved, how-
ever, the Court has set definite limits on the government's choice of
policy. Although objectives of a wide variety have been held per-
missible even when civil liberties are involved,44 governmental choice
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection." (Emphasis supplied). Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
44 Protection of the public peace and the primary uses of streets and parks,
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949);
Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Davis v. Massachu-
setts, 167 U.S 43 (1897). Protection of the war effort and prevention of sabotage,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Milwaukee Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920); Pierce
v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S, 204 (1919). Prevention of overthrow of government by force, Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
through protection of the school system, Adler v. Board of Ed. of City of New
York, 72 S. Ct. 380 (1952). Prevention of recurrence of violence during picketing,
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941). Prevention of coer-
don of employees' choice of bargaining representative, Building Service Union v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950). To encourage self-employed persons, Teamsters
Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). To prevent racial discrimination through
picketing, Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). To further
State's anti-trust policy, Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949);
Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). To prevent unfair labor
practices, Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
To prevent interference with the course of justice, Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
1952]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of policy which is inconsistent with dynamic democracy has been re-
peatedly declared unconstitutional. 45  Government cannot prohibit
full competition in ideas of any sort. Once again statements of the
Court best illustrate this development:
... stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that for-
bidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the
dissemination of ideas.46
The right to distribute handbills concerning religious sub-
jects on the streets may not be prohibited at all times, all
places, and under all circumstances.47
It follows from these considerations that, consistently with
the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful dis-
cussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings
for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.
48
What these appellants communicated were their beliefs and
opinions concerning domestic measures and trends in nation-
al and world affairs. Under our decisions criminal sanctions
cannot be imposed for such communications. 49
A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully ex-
ercising the right of free communication by drawing the
circle of economic competition between employers and work-
ers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly
employed by him.50
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion .... 51
Concisely summarized, these judicial expressions establish that
454 (1907). Protection of children, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
To protect interstate commerce from the threat of political strikes and labor
unrest, American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). To
prevent influencing by or of government employees during elections, United Public
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). To prevent race
defamation, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1952).
45 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290, 293 (1951); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509, 512 (1948) ; West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); A.F. of
L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 (1940);
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 517 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451
(1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386 (1927).
46 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
47 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
48 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
49 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 590 (1943).
50 A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941).
51 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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"government cannot longer choose to forbid either the interchange or
the consequences of unpopular political, economic, social, and re-
ligious ideas."52
In this connection the many cases in which vague and indefinite
statutes have been held unconstitutional again become significant,
for one of the reasons these statutes are invalidated is that they pro-
hibit not only activities which the State may constitutionally proscribe,
but also those activities which government has no right to prohibit.
As stated by the Court, "It is settled that a statute so vague and in-
definite, in form and as interpreted, so as to permit within the scope of
its language the punishment of incidents fairly without the protection
of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment." 53
Since objectives inconsistent with dynamic democracy have no
factual public interest and are thus unconstitutional when there has
been an invasion of civil rights, it is relevant to consider how the
government determines what the objective of particular governmental
action is. Does the Court accept the profession of purpose by the
legislature, or does it go beneath the surface to determine whether or
not there is an underlying motive different from that profession? Or
perhaps the legislature may have sincerely intended its profession of
purpose, but the statute is so drawn that it could be administered in
such a way as to achieve a forbidden purpose. Will the Court con-
sider this administratively-possible purpose as the real objective?
Although each of these three referents - legislative profession,
actual legislative purpose, and administratively-possible purpose -
has been used in the decision of First Amendment cases, there is today
no clear-cut rule. In the economic field, where the problem first arose,
there is a long standing rule that the Court will accept legislative
profession,54 a necessary corollary to the "presumption of constitu-
tionality" accorded economic legislation. At first it was felt that the
same rule might apply in the civil rights area, but beginning with a
52 STRONG, AmucAn CoNsTrrrTIONAL LAW 893 (1950).
53 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948). Other cases which have
held broad, vague or indefinite statutes unconstitutional are: Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268 (1951); Termienello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940) ; Schneid-
er v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
54 Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537,
538 (1934); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446, 451, 452 (1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-661 (1886); Sinking-
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878).
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casual footnote reference 55 the Court has stated several times that in
this area it will look behind legislative profession to find the actual
legislative purpose. 5n Other cases, while not overtly recognizing the
problem, have in fact gone behind the legislative profession to find an
actual legislative or an administratively-possible purpose incon-
sistent with dynamic democracy and therefore forbidden by the
Constitution.57
An example of the Court's recognition of an actual legislative
purpose different from the legislative profession is Grosjean v. American
Press Co, 58 which invalidated a gross receipts tax on advertising in
newspapers. The legislature had professed that the tax was for revenue
purposes, but the Court said, "It is bad because, in the light of its
history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of in-
formation to which the public is entitled by virtue of the Constitution-
al guaranties." 59
In Martin v. City of Struthers60 the Court held unconstitutional
an ordinance forbidding distributors of handbills of any type to
summon householders to the door to receive them. Despite the legis-
lative profession that the purpose of the ordinance was to insure
peace and quiet in a community where many worked at night and
slept during the day, the Court stated: "The dangers of distribution
can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to
each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive
strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose
but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the
dissemination of ideas."61
In Hague v. C.I.O.,62 the Court did not deny that the legislative
profession of public peace, comfort and safety was the real motive for
an ordinance requiring a permit to hold public meetings in streets or
other public places, but found that because of a lack of standards for
granting the permits, the ordinances could be administrated in such a
way as to achieve discrimination, a constitutionally forbidden purpose.
55 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
56 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry 301
U.S. 242 (1937).
57 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
58 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
59 Id. at 250.
60 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
61 Id. at 147.
62 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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"It (the ordinance) does not make comfort or convenience in the use
of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director
of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will
prevent disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the
record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of
free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all
speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." 63
Had the cases stopped here the principle would be clear, but of
late there have been cases indicating a return to the philosophy of
Gitlow v. New York where the Court declared that "Every presump-
tion is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute."64 In
Dennis v. United States Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated, "In other
cases, moreover, we have given clear indication that even when free
speech is involved we attach great significance to the determination of
the legislature."0' 5 Since a presumption of constitutionality of necessity
includes accepting legislative profession of purpose, there is at present
at least a trend toward applying the same rule in this area as that
applied in the economic field. This trend is given added impetus by
the fact that in at least one recent case precedents from the economic
field have been cited.66 On the other hand, the language supporting
this trend has been only dictum, for in none of these cases was there
any doubt but that legislative profession and actual objective were the
same. Until the Court does refuse to go behind profession in a civil
rights case where the actual purpose of the legislature could easily be
different from that professed, it must be assumed that government's
professed objective is always suspect.
Whichever referent for finding objective the Court uses, if the
objective found is inconsistent with dynamic democracy the govern-
mental action will be unconstitutional because there can be no
"factual" public interest connected with it. The mere finding of a
constitutionally permitted objective, however, does not always mean
constitutionality. The problem of weighing that factual public interest
63 Id. at 516. A further illustration of this type of administratively-possible
forbidden purpose is Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
64 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925). Other cases indicating a return to this philosophy
are: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (see concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter at 538-542 for discussion of the problem); Teamsters Union v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475 (1950); American Communications Association v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage 8- Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-95 (1949) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1926).
65 341 U.S. 494, 540 (1951).
66 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) citing the following cases:
"Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-661;
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144."
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still remains, and that problem is solved by the Court's consideration
of the factors below.
Substantive Importance of Government's Objective.
There are many constitutionally permissible objectives even in
the civil rights area, and they vary greatly in their substantive im-
portance to society. The degree of substantive importance of the
objective of particular governmental action is a major consideration
in deciding whether or not there is enough public interest in that
action to override any private invasion of personality rights which it
entails. Of necessity a decision as to substantive importance is a value
judgment. In First Amendment cases that value judgment is made
with the knowledge that what government is trying to justify or over-
ride is an invasion of freedoms always deemed of vital importance to
our democratic society.6 7 Because of this, many objectives may be con-
stitutionally permitted, but yet not of enough substantive importance
to society to justify restrictions on First Amendment freedoms. This
the Court has expressly recognized:
We first note that many of the cases in which this Court has
reversed convictions by use of this (clear and present danger)
or similar tests have been based on the fact that the interest
which the State was attempting to protect was itself too in-
substantial to warrant restriction of speech.68 (Emphasis
supplied).
Most of the case language concerning this factor has been in the
negative, that unless governmental action is aimed at preventing a
serious evil it is unconstitutional:
Since that time this Court has decided that however great the
likelihood that a substantial evil will result, restrictions on
speech and press cannot be sustained unless the evil itself is
67 In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
his concurring opinion at 278-282 discusses the cases from this point of view, com-
paring the importance to society in achieving the objective of the governmental
action involved as against the importance of the individual interests invaded by
that action.
68 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). The Court there lists
the following cases as those in which the interest the State was attempting to pro-
tect was too insubstantial to warrant restrictions on speech: Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1989); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946).
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"substantial" and "relatively serious" ..... or sometimes "ex-
tremely serious" . . . . And it follows therefrom that even
harmful conduct cannot justify restrictions upon speech
unless substantial interests of society are at stake.69 (Emphasis
supplied).
The essential idea is that since First Amendment freedoms are
themselves so tremendously important to a free society, the Court will
require that the goal of governmental action invading those freedoms
be at least as important to our society as the freedoms destroyed.
"Charges (published) of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of
official malfeasance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but the
theory of the constitutional guaranty is that even a more serious
public evil would be caused by authority to prevent publication." 70
Of great significance here, in this writer's opinion, is a recent de-
velopment, highlighted by the picketing cases, to the effect that when
speech is an integral part of conduct it may be subjected to restrictions
not because of any evil which the speech may occasion, but because of
some evil that may be brought about by the conduct of which the
speech is a part. "It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute. We reject that contention now."7 1  (Emphasis supplied).
Historically the First Amendment was initially applied in situations
where speech itself was being restricted to prevent some evil directly
attributable to speech. Such evils are limited in number, interference
with government being the chief among them as illustrated by the
Espionage cases. The result was that governmental action aimed
directly at speech could have only a few possible legitimate objectives,
and the problem of measuring the substantive importance of those
objectives was not too difficult. When we recognize that speech can be
and is an integral part of much of our everyday conduct, however, the
problem becomes much more complex. Government may have a great
variety of objectives in regulating conduct, and of course a regulation
of conduct necessarily affects any speech which is an integral part of
that conduct. When the First Amendment is invoked in these cases the
problem is no longer the simple one of a statute aimed directly at
69 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397 (1950).
Other examples are: "Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to
prohibition of these functions [free speech and assembly] unless the evil apprehended
is relatively serious." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374, 377 (1926); "The
easiest cases have been those in which the only interest opposing free communica-
tion was that of keeping the streets of the community dean. This could scarcely
justify prohibiting the dissemination of information by handbills or censoring
their contents." Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951).
70 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931).
71 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
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speech to prevent an evil resulting from speech alone. Since the early
1930's First Amendment protection has been claimed in many of these
hybrid situations, and the Court, by recognizing the applicability of
the First Amendment, has opened up a whole new area of legitimate
objectives for governmental action directly restrictive of conduct and
only indirectly restrictive of speech. Since these objectives may vary
greatly in their substantive importance to society, the Court's value
judgment as to this factor becomes of great importance in this hybrid
area. A few quotations from the Court should clarify this proposition:
It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being the
equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable
legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond the control of a State
if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose
which it seeks to effectuate gives groundi for its disallowance.7 2
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the
very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which
are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing
make it the subject of restrictive regulation. 3
Section 9 (h), in other words, does not interfere with speech
because Congress fears the consequences of speech; it regulates
harmful conduct.... .4
The granting of First Amendment protection in these hybrid
situations has forced the Court to adjust its position somewhat. Pure
speech can give rise to only a relatively few evils - espionage, sedition,
interference with a war effort, and perhaps defamation. Restrictions
imposed directly upon pure speech, on the other hand, can very easily
prevent the dissemination of valuable ideas. Thus the Court could
require a large degree of substantive importance before a government
objective could justify invasions of pure speech, and the efficiency of
government would not be seriously hampered. When dealing with
speech as an integral part of conduct, however, government may have
to face a whole new variety of evils, for example all the possible
economic evils including strikes, violence in picketing, interference
with commerce, and the promotion of monopoly. In this area, further-
more, governmental action honestly aimed at restricting conduct,
though it may incidentally interfere with speech, contains little danger
of preventing the dissemination of pure ideas. As a result the Court in
this hybrid type of situation has not required the great degree of
substantive importance to society that it requires in the pure speech
area. Apparently the Court has felt that so strict a requirement would
render government ineffective.
72 Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of California, 539 U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
73 Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942).
74 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 (1950).
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Nexus Between Governmental Action and Objective.
The nexus or connection between governmental action and its
objective is an important factor in weighing the public interest of that
governmental action. Although governmental action may be honestly
aimed at a permitted objective of substantial importance to society,
the problem still remains of how closely the legislature's choice of a
method or route for reaching that objective is connected with that
objective. Is there overwhelming evidence that this mode of govern-
mental action will always achieve its objective and only its objective;
does the evidence indicate only a 50-50 chance the objective will be
reached; or is there merely a quantum of evidence that the objective
will be reached? Obviously, the stronger the evidence that the ob-
jective and only the objective will be reached the greater the public
interest, and correspondingly the more likely that the governmental
action will be constitutional.
An understanding of the present significance of the nexus factor
can only be achieved through an historical approach, for of all the
factors involved in First Amendment cases, nexus has been the most
consistently considered and the most consistently confused.7 5 To add
to the confusion, nexus has rarely been considered in its isolated form,
but has been tied up with other factors and considered together with
them through the now famous "clear and present danger" test laid
down by Mr. Justice Holmes in what was perhaps the first significant
First Amendment Case, Schenck v. United States:7 6
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. 7
As thus formulated the test required a permitted objective of
considerable substantive importance as well as an immediate nexus or
overwhelming evidence that the governmental action chosen would
reach its objective in the particular situation before the Court. While
the "clear and present danger" test has continued to represent a con-
sideration of at least these three factors, we will here consider it only
as it is pertinent to the nexus factor alone. In this connection, as in-
75 "I must leave to others the ungrateful task of trying to reconcile all these
dedsions." Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494,539 (1951).
76 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
77 Id. at 52. For discussion of the clear and present danger test see: Corwin,
Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment, 30 Yt L. J. 48 (1920);
Goodrich, Does the Constitution Protect Free Speech? 19 ,ficn. L. R~v. 487 (1921).
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dicated above, it required a showing of overwhelming evidence that
the individual's acts would culminate immediately in a serious evil
if governmental intercession was to be constitutional. This was a
stringent requirement, and, if applicable to every First Amendment
case, it foreclosed the use of a balancing process because of that
stringency.
Since the Schenck case, supra, the dear and present danger test
has had a rather complicated history. In the later World War I
espionage cases it was at first reiterated, but the last of these cases
found Mr. Justice Holmes, joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting
from conviction on the ground that there had been no finding of a
clear and present danger38 In the years which have followed the Court
at times has upheld governmental action which could not possibly
meet the stringent requirements of the test, although the Court ap-
parently felt it was using it,79 at other times it has distinguished the
test,80 ot expressly rejected it,81 while on still other occasions it has
78 The Justices dissented in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S.
239 (1920).
79 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
80 ". . . it would be sheer folly as a matter of governmental policy for an
existing government to refrain from inquiry into potential threats to its existence
or security until danger was clear and present." Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d
241 (App. D.C.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); "For regulation of employees
it is not necesasry that the act regulated be anything more than an act -reasonably
deemed by Congress to interfere with the efidency of public service." (Emphasis
supplied). United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947);
"It [the state] cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures
for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual dis-
turbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own
destruction; but it may in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened
danger in its incipiency." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
81 "This confusion suggests that the attempt to apply the term 'dear and
present danger,' as a mechanical test in every case touching First Amendment free-
doms, without regard to the context of its application, mistakes the form in which
an idea was cast for the substance of the idea.... It is the consideration that gave
birth to the phrase, 'clear and present danger,' not the phrase itself that are vital
in our decision of questions involving liberties protected by the First Amendment."
American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950); Railway
Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) where the Court stated that to in-
validate the ordinance before it would be to hold "that this regulation had no
relation to the traffic problem of New York City." (Emphasis supplied); "Libellous
utterances, not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is un-
necessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the
phrase 'dear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend that obscene
speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances.
Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 S.Ct. 725,
735 (1952).
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emphatically affirmed its 2 and finally it has often simply ignored the
test.8 3 In addition the Court has switched from its early emphasis on
the actions of the individuals being acted against by government8 4
to a present emphasis on the overall effect of the governmental action
being considered. Today, even though government may establish the
required nexus in a given case as to the individual before the Court,
if the statute could possibly be used to accomplish a non-permitted
objective, or if its thrust could possibly reach individuals for whom
the required nexus could not be shown, the statute must fall.S5 High-
82 Termienello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (sometimes regarded as requiring
an even stricter test than clear and present danger); Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Craig v. Harney, 331 US. 367 (1947); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hartzel v.
United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 US. 583 (1943); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); A.F. of
L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
83 Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamster's
Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339
U.S. 460 (1950); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 US,
558 (1948); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); In re Summers, 325 U.S.
561 (1945); Cafeteria Union v. Angelos, 320 US. 293 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 53 (1942); Bakery
Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722 (1942); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Drivers Union v. Meadowmoore Co., 312 US, 287
(1941); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938);
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1926); Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). Of course some of
these decisions held governmental action unconstitutional even though the clear
and present danger test was not mentioned.
8- "Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet
by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its
opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable
tendency to do so." Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 628 (1919). "The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger.... Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
85 "The statute requires no specific formula. It is not contended that only
the use of the word 'solicit' would violate the prohibition. Without such a limita-
tion the statute forbids any language which conveys, or reasonably could be found
to convey, the meaning of invitation." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1946).
"Petitioner was not convicted under a statute so narrowly construed. For all any-
one knows he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which,
for example, makes it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a con-
dition of unrest." Termieniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949).
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lighted by the Termieniello case, this new emphasis has led some ob-
servers to conclude that only a breakdown in society can justify gov-
ernmental invasion of First Amendent Freedoms.80 Recent cases,
however, hardly justify that conclusion.
The many approaches which the Court has adopted toward the
nexus factor make it obvious that the cases cannot be lined up to reach
a set of mathematical rules. Although the cases indicate a striving for
certainty, chiefly through the use of the clear and present danger test
as an automatic formula, the Court has been unable to achieve it, even
as to the nexus factor. Instead, the Court has placed increasing em-
phasis on the fact that in the civil liberties area only a balancing
process can provide a satisfactory answer. This rules out the clear and
present danger test or any other rigid principle. "This conflict of in-
terests cannot be resolved by a dogmatic preference for one or the
other, or by a sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic
disguise for an unresolved conflict. If adjudication is to be a rational
process, we cannot escape a candid examination of the conflicting
claims with full recognition that both are supported by weighty title-
deeds."s7
Apparently here as with other factors difficulty arose when the
Court in the 1930's began to recognize claims of First Amendment
freedoms in hybrid situations, where speech and conduct were tied to-
gether and speech is interfered with only because of an attempt to
regulate conduct. In the early cases concerned with the pure speech
situations, the Court knew that government need fear only a few evils
and that there was much danger from allowing restrictions on pure
speech. Therefore the rigid requirements of the clear and present
danger test were appropos. With the granting of First Amendment pro-
tection to the hybrid situation, however, much more complex issues
were raised. Now government might have to act against a great variety
of evils flowing from conduct and still face the challenge that First
Amendment freedoms were being indirectly curtailed. Furthermore,
allowing government to act in these situations did not present the
danger of interfering with the dissemination of ideas that regulation
of pure speech presented. As the late cases indicate, the Court has un-
86 This has been the common interpretation given to Termieniello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949), and was the view advocated by Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn in
MEIIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNAFENT chap. 2 (1948).
According to Dr. Meiklejohn, "The only allowable justification of it [suppression
of the interchange of ideas] is to be found, not in the dangerous character of a
specific set of ideas, but in the social situation which, for the time, renders the
community incapable of the reasonable consideration of the issues of policy which
confront it." Id. at 54-55.
87 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951). For other cases repudiat-
ing a rigid rule and emphasizing the necessity of a balancing process see cases cited
note 3 supra.
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doubtedly abandoned the clear and present danger test, at least in
the hybrid situations, and now employs a balancing process of weigh-
ing the individual interest as against the public interest through a
consideration of many factors of which nexus is only one.88 While it
is true that the Court still clings to the verbal formulation, "clear and
present danger," the recent case of Dennis v. United States8 9 which
adopted Judge Learned Hand's statement of the rule indicates it is
no longer a rigid test, but a balancing process. As Judge Learned Hand
stated it:
In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the
"evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.90 (Emphasis
supplied).
Significantly the Supreme Court itself said, "As articulated by
Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we
might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors
which we deem relevant, and relates their significance. More we cannot
expect from words." 9 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, today, whether or not the Court uses the words "clear and
present danger," what is meant is a balancing process rather than a
rigid rule. Nexus is only one factor considered in that process, though
it may be stated that the closer the nexus between governmental action
and its objective, the more likely that governmental action will be
constitutional.
Basis Used to Establish Nexus.
In establishing the nexus or connection between governmental
action and its objective, government may have relied on the character-
istics of the separate individuals coming within the scope of the
regulations, or it may have relied on the characteristics of a class to
justify regulation or restrictions on every member of that class regard-
less of whether they, as individuals, possess the class characteristics. At
one time class basis or "guilt by association" was thought to be un-
constitutional in the civil liberties area, but, since the late 1940's at
least, this is no longer true. As with the other factors already discussed,
basis is only one element to be considered in determining whether the
88 The writer wishes to repeat that this comment is in no way an attempt to
discuss the wisdom of this new attitude.
89 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
90 Id. at 510.
91 Ibid.
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public interest in allowing governmental action overrides the indivi-
dual interest in preventing the invasion of that action. While an in-
dividual basis for governmental action certainly adds much more
weight to the public interest in that action, in given situations the other
factors may be such that even the class basis for legislation will be
enough to override the particular invasion of individual freedoms
involved.
While some authorities feel that recent cases indicate that "guilt
by association" is permissible in every First Amendment situation, it
is submitted that every one of the cases in which the Court has validated
the class basis has been one involving the hybrid situation where what
is aimed at is conduct, and restrictions on First Amendment rights are
only incidental. The most recent case is Adler v. Board of Education
of New York92 which sustained the constitutionality of New York's
civil service law. The New York Act, as implemented by the Feinberg
Law, denied the privilege of employment in the school system on the
ground of unexplained membership in any organization found to
teach and advocate overthrow of government by force or violence.
What the restriction was aimed at was the indoctrination or teaching
of propaganda to school children. The Court said: "In the employment
of officials and teachers of the school system, the state may very proper-
ly inquire into the company they keep, and we know of no rule, con-
stitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when determining the
fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations
and persons with whom they associate." 93 (Emphasis supplied). Here
the Court was dealing with the hybrid situation, for speech in and of
itself was not restricted, only speech used as an integral part of teach-
ing was affected.
Other outstanding cases approving the use of the class basis have
also involved the hybrid situation. The Douds case 94 which permitted
the use of the characteristics of Communists as a class to justify gov-
ernmental restrictions of labor unions was aimed at the conduct of
political strikes. The Mitchell case 95 which permitted justification of
the Hatch Act by the traits of federal employees as a group was aimed
at the conduct of influencing elections.
Illustrative of the conclusion that the permissability of class basis
depends on the result of a balancing process rather than a strict rule
or formula is the group of cases dealing with classification by race.
When faced with governmental action directly restrictive of political
rights the Courts invalidated the class basis. The case was Nixon v.
92 72 S. Ct. 380 (1952).
93 Id. at 285.
94 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
95 33D U.S. 75 (1947).
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Herndon,9 6 invalidating a Texas statute which provided that "in
no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party
primary election held in the State of Texas." The Court said:
States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to
believe rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear for
extended argument that color cannot be made the basis of a
statutory classification affecting the right set up in this case. 97
On the other hand, segregation of races, the equivalent of class basis,
is still permissible in education and public accomodations so long as
"equal facilities" are afforded.98 Clearly the answer is gotten only on
the balancing of many factors.
In Korematsu v. United States9 9 the class basis was used to demon-
strate the necessity of excluding the Japanese people from the West
Coast. While the Court upheld this instance of "guilt by association,"
it clearly indicated that it did so only because of the war emergency.
The only conclusion of these cases is that basis is only one factor
in a balancing process. While the individual basis provides more
weight to public interest than does class basis, in certain situations
even class basis may be sufficient.
SYNTHESIS
We have seen that a decision as to the constitutionality of gov-
ernmental action invading First Amendment freedoms depends upon
a consideration and weighing of all of the factors which may be in-
volved in a particular case. Only then can the Court decide whether
or not the public interest in permitting the action outweighs the
individual interest in preventing the invasion.
Perhaps the familiar teeter-totter analogy of the law will best
illustrate how the factors are interrelated in First Amendment cases:
96 273 US. 536 (1927). Other cases invalidating classification by race are
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
97 Id. at 541.
98 State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); McAbe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
way Co., 235 U.S.. 151 (1914) ; Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948) ; Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
99 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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INDIVIDUAL INTEREST PUBLIC INTEREST
Nature of Aspect Invaded Substantive Importance of
Objective
Magnitude of the Invasion Nexus between Action and
Objective
Appropriateness of the Invasion Basis Used to Establish Nexus
UNCONSTITUTIONAL A CONSTITUTIONAL
After a finding of a factual invasion of First Amendment freedoms,
the individual interest side is weighed by a consideration of the nature
of the aspect invaded, the magnitude of the invasion, and the ap-
propriateness of the invasion. Then the Court determines whether or
not there is a factual public interest by determining whether or not
the governmental action has a constitutionally permitted objective.
If it has, the public interest side is weighed by a consideration of the
substantive importance of the objective, the nexus between that ob-
jective and the governmental action, and the basis used to establish
nexus. If the individual interest side weighs the heaviest, governmental
action is unconstitutional; if the public interest side weighs the
heaviest, governmental action is constitutional.
It should be emphasized that although each Justice normally con-
siders all the pertinent factors in a case, the weight that he assigns to
each factor is a value judgment and consequently may differ from that
of every other Justice. In addition the relative importance which each
Justice assigns to the factors is the result of a value judgment on his
part and may differ from that of the other Justices. With this in mind,
a consideration of several cases should shed light on the normal in-
terrelation of the factors.
In American Communications Association -v. Doudsoo the Court
sustained the constitutionality of Section 9 (h) of the National Labor
Relations Act as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947. Section 9 (h) imposed restrictions on and denied benefits to any
labor organizations whose officers had not filed so-called "non-Com-
munist" affidavits with the National Labor Board. In reaching its
decision, the Court overtly considered four factors. First, it recognized
that First Amendment freedoms had been invaded: " .. . Section 9 (h)
. . .has the further necessary effect of discouraging the exercise of
political rights protected by the First Amendment."' 01 This established
100 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
10, Id. at 393.
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a factual invasion, and the Court then considered magnitude in order
to weigh the individual interest involved. It found it slight: "When
the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms is relatively small .... 1102 After recognizing that
government's objective was a permitted one (indicating a factual
public interest) the Court considered the substantive importance of
that objective in order to weigh the public interest: "That Act was
designed to remove obstructions (to Interstate Commerce) caused by
strikes and other forms of industrial unrest."' 0 3 The Court then recog-
nized that only a reasonable rather than immediate nexus existed
between objective and legislation, and that that nexus was established
on a class basis: "We think it is clear, in addition, that the remedy
provided by Section 9 (h) bears reasonable relation to the evil which
the statute was designed to reach. Congress could rationally find that
the Communist Party is not like other parties in its utilization of posi-
tions of union leadership .... ,,"04 The Court emphasized that the
decision in the case could only be reached through a balancing pro-
cess, 10 5 and decided that, because the invasion of Section (9)h was so
slight in terms of magnitude, the important objective of government
overrode the invasion even though there was only a reasonable nexus
established on a class basis: "When the effect of a statute or ordinance
upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms is relatively small and
the public interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious that a
rigid test requiring a showing of imminent danger to the security of
the Nation is an absurdity."'06
A case similar in its synthesis of the factors is United Public
Workers of America (C.LO.) v. Mitchell10 7 which upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Hatch Act. Here, too, the Court acknowledged
a factual invasion of First Amendment freedoms: "The right claimed
as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a party
official or worker to further his own political views. Thus we have
a measure of interference by the Hatch Act and the Rules with what
otherwise would be the freedom of the civil servant under the First,
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.' 0 The Court felt, however, that the
magnitude of the invasion of those freedoms would be slight: "Con-
gress . . . leaves untouched full participation by employees in political
102 Id. at 397.
103 Id. at 387.
104 Id. at 390.
105 "When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and
the regulation results in an . . . abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is
to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented." Id. at 399.
106 Id. at 397.
107 330 US. 75 (1947).
108 Id. at 94.
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decisions at the ballot box and forbids only the partisan activity of
federal personnel deemed offensive to efficiency. With that limitation
only, employees may make their contributions to public affairs or
protect their own interests, as before the passage of the Act."'109 The
objective of the Hatch Act, on the other hand, the Court felt to be
extremely important: "To declare that the present supposed evils of
political activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would
leave the nation impotent to deal with what many sincere men believe
is a material threat to the democratic system."" x0 (Emphasis supplied).
The Court then recognized that here the class basis had been used:
"Evidently what Congress feared was the cumulative effect on employee
morale of political activity by all employees who could be induced to
participate actively. It does not seem to us an unconstitutional basis for
legislation.""' (Emphasis supplied). On balance, then, the Court felt
that because of the slight magnitude of the invasion and the sub-
stantive importance of the objective, this was a situation where even a
reasonable nexus and a class basis provided sufficient public interest to
override the invasion: "For regulation of employees it is not necessary
that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed
by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of public service.""12
While both the Douds and the Mitchell cases involved hybrid
situations, where regulation of conduct only incidentally invaded
First Amendment freedoms, the recent case of Beauharnais v. Illinois '3
involved a pure First Amendment situation and yet was treated by
the Court in much the same fashion as the Douds and Mitchell cases.
In the Beauharnais case the Court upheld the constitutionality of an
Illinois criminal libel statute which prohibited the exhibition of
lithographs portraying lack of virtue of a class or race and liable to
cause violence and disorder. The Court considered the individual in-
terest low in the situation because of its weighing of two factors. In
considering the aspect invaded, the Court found that the type of speech
prohibited contained no social interest, and so like cursing deserved
little protection: "Certainly no one would contend that obscene
speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such
circumstances [clear and present danger]. Libel, as we have seen, is in
the same class." 1 4 The Court further considered this particular in-
vasion very appropriate. While it recognized that certain individuals
such as Beauharnais might be precluded from speaking in a certain
way, the Court pointed out that unless government interceded the
109 Id. at 99.
110 Id. at 99.
311 Id. at 101.
112 Id. at 101.
113 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952).
114 Id. at 735.
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economic and civil rights of a whole class or race of people (here the
colored race) might be affected by those individuals. On balance, the
Court felt that the public interest in permitting this regulation over-
rode the invasions involved. It recognized that an objective of sub-
stantive importance was involved, and therefore felt that even a
rational nexus or relation was sufficient in the situation: "Only those
lacking responsible humility will have a confident solution for problems
as intractable as the frictions attributable to differences of race, color
or religion. This being so, it would be out of bounds for the judiciary
to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated
to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the
State's power."1 15
Thus, whether faced with a hybrid economic civil liberty or a
pure civil liberty case, the Court today uses a balancing process to
decide First Amendment cases.
CONCLUSION
Since 1919 when the first important First Amendment decision was
handed down, judicial implementation of First Amendment protection
has undergone a significant metamorphosis. Early cases involved what
may be termed pure First Amendment situations - a freedom was
directly restricted or regulated because of a fear of some evil directly
attributed to the use of that freedom. These situations could involve
only a relatively few evils such as espionage, while direct restrictions
on freedoms such as speech seemed repugnant to our idea of democracy,
and involved great danger of losing those freedoms. Applying the
"clear and present danger" test laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes, the
Court used a rigid type of determination in these cases. If a factual
invasion of freedoms was shown, no matter how slight its magnitude or
thrust, governmental action was declared unconstitutional unless it
could meet the "dear and present danger" test. That test required an
objective of great substantive importance to society and overwhelming
evidence or an immediate nexus between that objective and gov-
ernmental action.
In the 1930's, however, there began a metamorphosis in the Court's
attitude toward First Amendment cases. Our society had become a
complex one, and people demanded more and different services from
government. Individuals who felt the thrust of this increased govern-
ment regulation began to assert First Amendment protection in the
hybrid or civil liberty situations, where governmental action was in-
tended to regulate conduct, but also regulated speech or other freedoms
because they were an integral part of that conduct. The Court was in
115 Id. at 734.
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a difficult position. If they granted First Amendment protection and
applied the rigid "dear and present danger" test, governmental effici-
ency in our complex society would be threatened. On the other hand,
individuals seemed entitled to more protection in these situations than
they could receive if they were labeled as purely economic situations,
and First Amendment protection refused. As a result, the First Amend-
ment was recognized as applicable, but a new and flexible method of
determination as to constitutionality was adopted. Now the Court be-
gan to consider the aspect of personality invaded, the magnitude of the
invasion, and its appropriateness to measure the individual interest;
and the substantive importance of the objective, the nexus between
objective and action, and the basis used to establish nexus to measure
the public interest. A consideration of these factors enabled the Court
to balance the individual interest as against the public interest and
reach their decision as to constitutionality on the basis of the result.
At first this new balancing process was reserved for use in the
hybrid or so-called economic civil liberty cases, while the rigid "dear
and present danger" test was apparently still to be applied in pure
First Amendment situations. In 1951, however, the Court had to face
a difficult decision in the case of Dennis v. United States.116 This in-
volved what many deemed the most serious threat Democracy has ever
had to face, Communism. While the Court in language retained the
"clear and present danger" test, the members of the Court and most
authorities who have 'written on the question have differed violently
as to whether it was actually and meaningfully applied. To this writer,
the true significance of the decision is that it marked the climax of a
struggle on the part of certain Justices to abandon the rigid "clear and
present danger" test even in pure First Amendment situations. A
significant statement of an outstanding authority on Constitutional
Law, Paul Freund, was quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his con-
curring opinion in the case:
The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test is an over-
simplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number
of other factors; the relative seriousness of the danger in com-
parison with the value of the occasion for speech or political
activity; the availability of more moderate controls than those
which the state has imposed; and perhaps the specific intent
with which the speech or activity is launched. No matter how
rapidly we utter the phrase "clear and present danger," or how
closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute
for the weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of
certitude when what is most certain is the complexity of the
116 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must
disentangle. 117
That the balancing process has won out over the "clear and present
danger" test is even more clearly indicated by the 1952 case of Beau-
harnais v. Illinois.118 Again the Court was faced with a pure First
Amendment case dealing with defamation, but this time in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter the "dear and present danger" test
was deliberately laid aside. As indicated earlier in this comment, the
Court considered several factors and specifically approved "their
'tendency to cause breach of the peace'," and "a choice of policy, pro-
vided it is not unrelated to the problem. -119 (Emphasis supplied).
Whether or not this new flexible implementation of the First
Amendment was ever contemplated by the authors of the Constitution
is extremely doubtful. Whether or not it is wise policy has been and
still is the subject of great debate. Perhaps the only answer is to repeat
the words of Abraham Lincoln, "Must a government of necessity be
too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its
own existence?"
Leonard Goldberg
117 Id. at 542. The passage was quoted from FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE
SuPREm COURT 27-28.
118 72 S.Ct. 725.
119 Id. at 734.
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